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Summary
In this article I examine the participation of the earliest entrants in the War 
in Croatia (1991-1995). I address the greed/grievance debate within the con-
flict literature by demonstrating that measuring grievances at the macro level 
misses the micro level processes involved in mobilization. Using interviews 
with 21 Croatian war veterans, I look at who fought first, comparing the ini-
tial differences between early and later participants, those who joined before 
June 25, 1991, and those that joined after. I argue that early joiners belonged 
to a bounded community of those disaffected with Yugoslavia and Commu-
nism; however, these grievances alone do not explain their participation, rath-
er it was an individual’s inclusion in the dissident community and the so-
cial relationships within that community that clarify how the first participants 
were mobilized. The findings show that all but one of the earliest joiners who 
joined through a social connection belonged to Croatia’s dissident commu-
nity and were from families that supported NDH. The other joiners joined by 
themselves after encountering violence from the fighting first hand. The ma-
jority of the later joiners joined after experiencing violence as well. Two of the 
three who joined through a social connection were also part of the dissident 
community and from NDH associated families.
Keywords: War in Croatia, Mobilization, Collective Action, Domestic Conflict, 
War Veterans
Introduction
Why do individuals participate in armed conflict?1 In recent years, much of the re-
search on internal conflict has offered two competing explanations. The motives 
1 The author would like to thank the help and assistance of Ronald Francisco, Dejan Jović, Stevo 
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behind rebels, insurgents, and members of paramilitary organizations’ involvement 
in armed violence are seen to be either the chance to take advantage of material op-
portunities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hoeffler 2011), or as a means of righting a 
perceived injustice (Taydas et al. 2011; Gurr 1970, 1993; Weinstein 2005). Though 
the debate continues, most of the findings see the role of material opportunity as 
a more significant influence in the onset of conflict, than that of injustice. Though 
this dichotomy has come to dominate the discourse on internal conflict, it also has 
its critics who see it as too reductive to provide an accurate understanding of why 
individuals participate in the fighting (Lichbach 1998; Kalyvas 2003; Dixon 2009; 
Ross 2004). At its core, the greatest affliction facing this line of research is the lite-
rature’s reliance on macro level variables for both material opportunity and injus-
tice. Here macro level refers to aggregated data at the country. Though this area of 
research has produced a surfeit amount of work demonstrating the correlations be-
tween economic development, injustice and conflict, the fact that these studies rely 
on broad macro level data and proxy variables, such as GDP and unemployment, 
leaves a strong possibility that the more fundamental micro processes involved in 
the onset of conflict are lost when examined in the aggregate (Kalyvas 2003; Dixon 
2009; Francisco 2009). Therefore, it is necessary to examine the role material op-
portunity and injustice play in fostering participation at the micro level. By micro 
level I am referring to data at the individual level. 
In this article I engage in an examination of the micro level processes involved 
in participation by focusing on a specific conflict’s earliest entrants. Appreciating 
the importance of the first participants is necessary in understanding the dynamics 
within a conflict as these individuals are ultimately responsible for developing the 
strategies and circumstances that induce greater mobilization over the course of the 
war. Using interviews with war veterans from the Croatian Homeland War (1991-
1995), I look at who fought first, comparing the initial differences between early 
and later participants. I argue that early joiners belonged to a bounded community 
of those disaffected with Yugoslavia and Communism; however, these grievances 
alone do not explain their participation, rather it was an individual’s inclusion in 
the dissident community and the social relationships within that community that 
explain how the first participants were mobilized. I offer that the first fighters were 
socially mobilized into participating in the earliest days of the conflict. This per-
spective challenges those views that place an emphasis on material incentives (Col-
lier and Hoeffler 2004; Hoeffler 2011) and those that regard grievances as the sole 
independent variable (Gurr 1970). By exploring the discontent of early joiners I am 
Fellowship in Croatia for 2011-2012. This is a reworked chapter from a larger work Why Do They 
Fight: Explaining Participation in the War in Croatia. The full work can be found here: http://
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able to show that grievances do have an influence on the onset of conflict, though it 
is not as direct as some models assume (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Lai-
tin 2003; Gurr 1970, 1993); secondly, by demonstrating that these grievances were 
largely contained to a specific community within the broader society, I am able to 
explain why there fails to be a strong relationship between grievances and the onset 
of conflict at the aggregate level (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Taydas et al. 2011).
I begin by discussing theories of conflict via the collective action problem and 
the limitations of the greed/grievance dichotomy in explaining the onset of war. I 
then explore non-material solutions to the collective action problem, paying par-
ticular attention to the importance of community solutions (Lichbach 1998). I then 
outline the boundaries and membership of the Croat dissident community in Yugo-
slavia. I explore the role of the grievances in early joining, explaining that among 
first fighters we should see a stronger attachment to the conflict’s main grievance or 
central cleavage than among later joiners. Afterwards, I present the interview me-
thodology and the initial differences between early and later joiners. I then engage 
in an analysis of the early joiners, using evidence from interviews, showing that 
early joiners’ grievances served to create a community from which individuals were 
mobilized by someone they knew, and who was involved in the preparation and or-
ganization of Croatia’s fledgling military forces. I argue that while the grievances 
helped identify likely candidates for recruitment, the mobilizing factor was actually 
the need to maintain good social relationships among the recruited and recruiters. 
In order to understand the importance of social relationships in Croatia, I engage 
in a brief explanation of the phenomenon of kumstvo, or family sponsorship. I then 
show that recruiting individuals who were members of the dissident community 
was a conscious strategy among the HDZ leadership. 
Collective Action and Greed/grievance 
It is largely accepted that prior to the onset of fighting, insurgents, rebels, defenders, 
paramilitaries, and revolutionaries all face a collective action problem (Olson 1965; 
DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1998; Kalyvas 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Wein-
stein 2005, 2007; Francisco 2009, 2010). When faced with fighting for a public 
good (whether it be independence, freedom, increased autonomy, or regime change) 
most would-be participants will free-ride, preferring to let someone else do the 
fighting, but still hoping to take part in the rewards (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1998). 
In order to overcome their collective action problem, dissidents need to be provided 
with selective incentives available only to those who participate. Material rewards, 
via pay from the dissident organization or loot from the battlefield are considered 
the most readily available and obvious forms of selective incentives with which par-
ticipants are able to be induced into participating. From this perspective participa-
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tion can be explained through participants’ own greed for material rewards (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004; Hoeffler 2011). 
Macro level models of conflict contend that amid economic crisis or limited 
economic development, individuals will be more willing to engage in conflict for 
material rewards (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The opportunity to profit from war 
looks more advantageous when facing an anemic economy or in areas with high 
unemployment. Initially this logic is compatible with the logic of collective action. 
One’s material self-interest is assumed to be the invisible hand of rebellion. Mean-
while, the injustice perspective appears problematic. If we assume that the righting 
of a collective wrong is the goal of a dissident organization, then we are still left 
wondering how that organization can overcome its collective action problem. After 
a community’s collective grievance is assuaged, all of the members of that commu-
nity benefit. At first glance, the grievance thesis is much less compatible with col-
lective action literature on conflict than the greed thesis and its emphasis on mate-
rial incentives. When it comes to macro level models, the greed hypothesis has been 
vindicated with stronger results than the grievance based models (Collier and Hoef-
fler 2004; Hoeffler 2011; Taydas et al. 2011). However, before we completely reject 
the grievance approach to conflict we first need to understand that while there exist 
strong correlations between economic variables and conflict, and weaker correla-
tions between grievance based variables and conflict, this could very well be due to 
the type of variables used and the reliance on macro level models. 
In their model Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use ethnic and religious fractionali-
zation, ethnic dominance and polarization as a measure of grievances. Gurr (1993) 
uses ordinal scales to measure grievances, such as a group’s economic rights, social 
rights, as well as an ordinal scale to measure a group’s disadvantages. The prob-
lem with each of these studies is that group based and macro level measures may 
be missing the grievances felt by the minority of the overall minority population. 
As Lichbach’s 5% rule indicates, in 95% of cases it is less than 5% of a given po-
pulation that will first participate in collective dissent (Lichbach 1998; Ainsworth 
2002). The processes involved in mobilizing the earliest participants are more likely 
than not to be unobserved in aggregated data, group wide measurements and macro 
level models. 
Returning to the problem of collective action we see that its solution depends 
less on macro level or broad contextual circumstances and more on the actions of 
those organizations and individuals seeking to mobilize a set of dissidents (Lich-
bach 1998; Weinstein 2005; Francisco 2009). Taken from this perspective it is ne-
cessary to examine the role of grievances and material incentives at the micro le-
vel.
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Beyond Material Incentives
Although much of the conflict literature is dominated by an emphasis on the rela-
tionship between participation and material incentives (Ross 2004; Collier et al. 
2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hoeffler 2011; Taydas et al. 2011), other research 
on domestic conflict acknowledges that social factors can also help induce partici-
pation (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1998; Kalyvas 2003; Wood 2003; Sageman 2004; 
Weinstein 2005, 2007). Lichbach refers to such solutions as those that are capable 
of overcoming “pecuniary self-interest” (Lichbach 1998: 111). In the place of ma-
terial rewards, normative values and shared identities within pre-existing organiza-
tions, networks, or communities are capable of producing solutions to the collective 
action problem (Lichbach 1998; Wood 2003; Sageman 2004; Weinstein 2007). A 
key piece of the solution is reciprocity within a bounded community. As Weinstein 
explains: 
The fact that participants have been and believe they will continue to be engaged 
in repeated interaction with others from the groups makes it important for them to 
cooperate today in order that others will cooperate with them in the future. (Wein-
stein 2007: 99)
Members of a community or group will assist each other in the present in order 
to ensure that they continue to be assisted in the future. 
In her work on collective action during the civil war in El Salvador, Wood 
(2003) observes that participation can result from the pleasure of engaging in effec-
tive action. Acquiring agency can motivate individuals to act, especially in circum-
stances and among groups that have developed common values that support and en-
dorse such action (Wood 2003; Lichbach 1998). Sageman extends this perspective 
by offering that cliques within a larger network operate as,
The social mechanism that puts pressure on prospective participants to join, de-
fines a certain social reality for the ever more intimate friends, and facilitates the 
development of a shared collective social identity and strong emotional feelings 
for the in-group. (2004: 154)
Groups alone can foster an in-group specific view of the world which is trans-
mitted to new members in their desire to belong to the group.
Another advantage of a pre-existing community is that such groups and net-
works commonly engage in a great deal of communication concerning their inten-
tions and goals prior to engaging in collective dissent. Such steady forms of com-
munication are more likely to induce members to join in collective action. Weinstein 
(2007), Lichbach (1998), Wood (2003) and Sageman (2004) all argue that commu-
nication can be important in establishing values for action and dissent within a par-
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ticular community, endowing members with a mutual understanding that one’s par-
ticipation is dependent on another’s, and vice versa (Lichbach 1998: 113). Mancur 
Olson (1965) stressed that small groups can exert interpersonal pressure to force 
members to act. In a small group an actor who knows that others’ participation is de-
pendent on hers, and that participation is expected among all members of the group 
creates efficacious feelings and establishes norms of reciprocity.
It should be said that operating in tandem with community solutions in the 
Homeland War were two crucial elements. The first was a pre-existing organiza-
tion, in this case the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, 
HDZ). The second was the hierarchical structure of the party. I mention this in or-
der to show that the dissident community in Croatia did not suddenly and spontane-
ously decide to form its members into a fighting force, rather it was the HDZ lead-
ership that made the initial steps towards mobilization; however, it was among the 
dissident community and through its norms and relationships that HDZ was able 
to locate recruits and mobilize them. I anticipate that the earliest joiners were so-
cial joiners, meaning they joined through a relationship with a member of the same 
community, while the later joiners were mobilized, not by relationships and shared 
values, but by the prevalence of indiscriminate violence.
It is important to briefly address the relationship between violence and par-
ticipation. While it is often assumed that increased violence deters participation, 
research shows that in fact increased violence, especially when seen as indiscrimi-
nate, shares a positive relationship with participation. This was first developed by 
Lichbach (1998) who argues that dissident actions often purposely provoke state 
reprisals in order to stimulate greater mobilization. Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) de-
monstrate that individuals may see the costs of not participating as greater than 
those that come with participation. In another paper, I statistically confirm a posi-
tive relationship between the number of attacks and the number of participants in a 
given municipality in Croatia during the Homeland War (Brown 2013). Based on 
my own findings and those of the broader literature, the expectation that later join-
ers were mobilized by violence is well supported. The relationship between vio-
lence and participation makes understanding the early joiners all the more compel-
ling as they joined prior to the onset of sustained fighting. 
Community
In order to accurately observe the role of community solutions in overcoming the 
collective action problem it is necessary to identify the community in question. I 
do not assume that the boundaries of this community included all Croats and ex-
cluded all non-Croats. Croatian national and ethnic identity was certainly not that 
monolithic, nor did Croatians all share the same goals. For instance we see that the 
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majority of Croats did not favor full independence. As Gagnon (2006) shows, only 
15% of Croatians wanted full independence for Croatia in 1990, while 64% favored 
a confederation with Yugoslavia (Gagnon 2006: 135). Klanjšek and Flere (2011) 
also show that there was not an overwhelming longing for an independent home-
land among the majority of Croats in 1990. Even among HDZ supporters, only 
30% favored independence over a confederation (Gagnon 2006: 135). Therefore, 
the community from which the first fighters began to participate in the preparation 
and organization of the conflict was relatively small. It is necessary then to identify 
its boundaries and the criteria for membership. 
Charles Tilly offers that broader societies often have contiguous zones within 
them that serve as boundaries among members of a wider community (2005: 134). 
For our purposes I regard what interview subjects referred to as the hrvatska stvar 
(the Croatian thing, but understood better in English as the Croatian question) to be 
the contiguous zone around which social boundaries were delineated in Croatia and 
Yugoslavia. The central issues of the Croatian question can be understood as the 
issues of Croat goals for an independent state, the rights of Croats in Yugoslavia, 
Croatia’s position in the socialist federation, and interpretations regarding Croatia’s 
past, especially during the Second World War. 
The clarity of this boundary was intensified by the Communist’s prohibition 
on unofficial public discussions of the past and by suppressing outward displays of 
Croatian nationalism or even patriotism. Croatian national aspirations go at least as 
far back as the 19th century; however, during the Second World War the Croatian 
Independent State (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) was aligned with Axis Pow-
ers and led by a Fascist regime, the Ustaša. In the post-war period Croatian support 
for independence or patriotism became associated with the Fascist regime and its 
crimes. What is more, in the aftermath of the war, Croats who had (or were suspect-
ed of having) supported the NDH were discriminated against by the Communists. 
Associates of the NDH were denied employment and educational opportunities 
(Hockenos 2003). Members of this community, those on the losing side of WWII 
in Croatia, were not allowed to openly mourn their losses, nor were they aloud to 
publicly air their dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia.
While discussions of the past and the Croatian question were interdicted pub-
licly, they continued privately. The memory of the war and the goal of an independ-
ent Croatia endured among certain members of the public. Many of these individu-
als migrated to Western Europe, North America and Australia, where they formed 
organizations aimed at overthrowing the Communist regime and liberating Croatia 
(Hockenos 2003). Many of those who remained in Yugoslavia continued to be con-
cerned with the Croatian question. For example, in an interview in Drniš my inter-
locutor explained that his family frequently discussed the Second World War and 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2013, pp. 7-28
14
what they saw as limitations on Croat rights in Yugoslavia. The subject went on to 
explain that everyone in the area remembered whose side each family had been on, 
but that you only discussed such things with those who had been on the same side. 
He added that this was the reason they (meaning his family) hated Communist Par-
tisans. Saying, they hated Partisans more than Četniks (Serb royalist, nationalist 
paramilitaries in WWII), since at least with a Četnik you knew where he stood. Par-
tisans, on the other hand, were traitors since they were Croat, but potentially traitors 
of Croatia (Drniš 02/24/2012). 
Other interview subjects related similar experiences, suggesting that precluded 
discussions of the past in the public helped create a discreet community in which the 
cost of membership could be further discrimination or even jail. Some interviewees 
went to jail or had relatives jailed for dissident activities involving the Croatian ques-
tion, such as singing patriotic songs, having contact with the nationalist diaspora, 
or writing patriotic graffiti in public view. Belonging to the community itself was 
an act of dissent, which helped foster the values and norms that would later facili-
tate collective action. The boundaries of the community were how one regarded the 
Croatian question, while the level of belonging to this community was determined by 
one’s stance, and the strength of that stance, on the Croatian question. 
Local and Central Motivations
Examining the differences between the early and later joiners can also help clarify 
where violence originates. On top of the greed/grievance dichotomy the literature 
has developed another dichotomy surrounding the origins of violence. Violence is 
regarded as a consequence of local or central interests (Kalyvas 2003). Centrally 
interested actors are thought to be motivated by the grievances concerning the con-
flict’s central cleavage; locally interested actors are believed to be motivated by lo-
cal, often material interests. In this paper, I argue that the earliest participants joined 
socially from a pre-existing community whose boundaries were defined by one’s 
stance on the conflict’s central cleavage, the Croatian question (i.e., the goal of an 
independent Croatia), demonstrating that the earliest violence has origins at the 
center of the conflict. Early joiners should all exhibit a strong orientation around 
the central cleavage of the conflict, while later joiners should demonstrate a greater 
ideological and social distance from the central cleavage, which explains why they 
were mobilized later, by localized violence. 
The fact that the group’s identity was bounded by individuals’ dissatisfaction 
with the status quo in Yugoslavia exemplifies that these individuals held strong 
grievances against the state and the Communist authorities. We see then that the 
central cleavage, in this case, is also a shared grievance. At the same time, the fact 
that the community’s grievances were largely related to past events and further in-
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tensified by the interactions within the group itself (Sageman 2004) is a good indi-
cation as to why any statistical significance between the central cleavage and the 
onset of the conflict would not be observed at the aggregate level. The measure 
of grievance is not necessarily evident in the present. As this chapter will show, 
the participation of these individuals very much depended on their dissatisfaction 
with Croatia’s historical lot in Yugoslavia, and the early actions of these individuals 
played a crucial role in the opening days of the conflict. 
Research Methodology
I use interviews with former participants in the Croatian War in order to show the 
differences between early and later joiners. From February 2012 to September 2012, 
I conducted 32 interviews with Croatian war veterans in Dalmatia, Central Croatia 
and Slavonia. The interviews usually lasted between one to three hours and were 
conducted in subjects’ place of business, homes, or cafes. The topic of the Croatian 
Homeland War remains a very sensitive issue in Croatia and the surrounding coun-
tries. As a result I usually had to use someone to personally request the interview 
with the subject. This required us to find family members and friends of war vete-
rans to introduce us and ask for an interview. Even still, many of the individuals 
we requested interviews with declined. This was especially the case with former 
members of paramilitary groups. Given the sensitive nature of the Homeland War 
today, it was necessary to offer anonymity or confidentiality to each subject. Even 
though the interviews were confidential or anonymous, most subjects refused to 
let us record the conversation. Therefore, my research assistant and I took rigorous 
notes during each interview and afterward combined them in detailed summaries. 
Anywhere that I use quoted text is a translation of a quote that was written down 
verbatim. Everywhere else, what the subject reported is paraphrased in a way that 
tries to closely capture what the subject said and how it was said. 
I asked each subject several open ended questions concerning their involve-
ment in the War, life in Yugoslavia, and their family’s role in the Second World War 
(see Appendix for a full description of the questions). For the purposes of this chap-
ter I focus on when and how each individual began serving the homeland, asked 
as “Kad ste se i kako stavili u službu domovine”? (When and how did you begin 
serving the homeland?). I also look at which side his family supported during the 
Second World War, labeled as SFRJ for Partisan or Yugoslavia supporters and NDH 
for supporters of the Croatian Fascist regime or groups associated with it; the pre-
sence of personal connections to someone involved in the early stages of the con-
flict prior to joining; and whether or not the subject experienced violence before 
joining. Out of the 32 interviews only 28 are considered viable. Some subjects re-
fused to answer questions in a way that could support this research. Those inter-
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2013, pp. 7-28
16
views have been subsequently removed from the analysis. Two interviews were 
conducted with individuals who were too young to enlist in 1991, and have also 
been removed from the analysis in this chapter. Additionally, the 5 interviews with 
members of the paramilitary group the Croatian Defense Forces (Hrvatske obram-
bene snage, HOS) are not included. The total number of interviews used for analy-
sis is 21. In the remainder of the article I look at interviews with war veterans and 
explore the motives of early joiners. 
The Pattern of Participation
I define an early joiner as someone who joined in the preparation, organization, 
and fighting in Croatia before June 25, 1991, the day Croatia first declared its in-
dependence from Yugoslavia. Later joiners are those who joined after this date, but 
before the introduction of conscription. The period of focus here is from 1990 to 
October 4, 1991, the day before President Tuđman announced de-facto conscrip-
tion (Immigration 1993). The contending explanations for early and later involve-
ment are the social relationships individuals shared with other participants or an 
individual’s experience with violence. As stated earlier, I expect that early joiners 
should exhibit stronger social ties within a specific dissident community than later 
joiners, while later joiners should have greater experience with levels of indiscrimi-
nate violence. 
Tables 1 and 2 show that my expectations are, for the most part, correct. In Ta-
ble 1, only three out of 12 early joiners did not have a connection or relationship 
with either the nationalist community or individuals already involved in the con-
flict. Two of the three with no relationship discussed a violent incident as factoring 
in on their decision to join, the 11 other individuals joined through someone, leav-
ing only one participant who does not fit either expectation. Table 2 shows that six 
of nine later joiners joined without a connection and after experiencing some level 
of violence, while the other three joined without experiencing violence but through 
a social relationship. In the remainder of this chapter I provide further evidence 
in support of the social aspects of early joining by exploring the process through 
which early participants joined in the conflict via respondents’ interviews.
Explaining Early Joiners
The first subject from Zagreb was in the Reserve Police (RP). During Yugoslavia 
the RP existed in the event that if the city or republic needed more police officers 
than those it had on hand, it could mobilize these reservists. According to the sub-
ject, beginning in 1990 the RP began acting as a parallel police force, designed to 
monitor what other police and the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslavenska narodna 
armija, JNA) were doing. At this point the certainty to which the newly elected HDZ 
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Government controlled the power structures in Croatia was in question. For exam-
ple, during a riot between Dinamo (Zagreb) and Red Star (Belgrade) football fans 
in Zagreb on May 13, 1990 there was the impression that the police acted more ag-
gressively towards Croats than towards Serbs (Tanner 1997: 228). A look at Table 
3 on the next page shows that nearly 30% of all sections of the Ministry of the In-
terior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova, MUP) in Croatia were populated by Serbs. 
The loyalty of the Serb policemen to Croatia was in question by President Tuđman’s 
newly elected government. It was feared that if the Serb policemen left Croatia or 
refused to follow orders, the police force would be considerably weakened. There-
fore, according to the interview subject, it was necessary to create a parallel police 
structure, one that could monitor the activities of police and the Serb dominated JNA 
while also waiting in the wings to fill any vacancies left by the defections of Serb po-
Table 1: Summary Table of Early Joiners

















































Table 2: Summary Table of Later Joiners
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lice officers. In order to assure that the RP would be loyal to the new regime, only se-
lected individuals were called to participate. Sometime in 1990 the subject was con-
tacted by his kum who worked in MUP. (The word kum can refer to one’s Godfather 
or Best Man in Southeastern Europe, see below for a more detailed explanation). 
The subject was then told to recruit two other individuals that he knew and trusted. 
The subject told me that in this way loyal RP cells were set up all over Zagreb.
The subject also related that in addition to his involvement with the RP he also 
helped Croat conscripts defect from the JNA. Again, these actions involved fami-
ly members or family friends. The subject, and others, would use vehicles from 
MUP to drive onto a JNA base with the purpose of taking a relative or friend out to 
lunch. This person would have already packed a few of his belongings in advance 
and would then leave in the MUP vehicle. He would be driven to his family’s resi-
dence for an hour or so, and then he would be taken somewhere where he could join 
the fledgling National Guard (Zbor narodne garde, ZNG). According to the subject, 
the strategy here was threefold: 1) it was a way to find able bodied men to join the 
ZNG; 2) it denied such a person to the JNA; 3) it made the Croats remaining in the 
JNA nervous about being the only Croats remaining in the JNA. Therefore it was 
hoped that they too would consider defecting. While this strategy is interesting in 
itself, what is most important is that the early defections relied on trust and famili-
arity between the recruits and the recruiters. According to the subject, the initial or-
ders for recruitment came from HDZ. 
The next subject, also from Zagreb, worked for the railroads during Yugoslavia. 
His family’s past involvement with the NDH (his uncle was an Ustaša) made it dif-
ficult for his father to find work. He therefore emigrated to Germany. Through his 
father and traveling around the continent on the railroads the subject had strong ties 
with the radical elements in the Croatian diaspora residing in Western Europe. Ac-
cording to the subject, in order to maintain his job and as a result of his connection 
with the nationalist diaspora he was forced to work for Yugoslavia’s secret police, 
the State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbednosti, UDBA), informing 
Table 3: Ethnic Makeup of the Croatian Interior Ministry 1990

























Total 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Table taken from Radelic et al. 2006: 82.
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on individuals in the diaspora. The subject relates that the leaders of the diaspora 
knew he was an informant and coached him on providing just enough correct infor-
mation for his UDBA handlers to keep them interested and to keep him employed. 
Eventually the subject became a reserve officer in the JNA. Sometime in 1990, the 
subject relates that he and other like minded officers held secret meetings organized 
by HDZ, in which they discussed how to establish an army for Croatia in the event 
of a war. According to the subject, the individuals at this meeting were those each 
member trusted, meaning someone with known greater sympathies to Croatia than 
to Yugoslavia. After establishing an army structure for Croatia the officers would 
recruit individuals to participate. A relationship and knowledge of one’s position on 
the issue of Croatia was a necessary precondition for recruitment. When asked how 
they would identify recruits, the subject simply replied that they knew “who would 
and who wouldn’t” participate (Zagreb 03/28/2012). 
This idea is supported by evidence from other parts of Croatia as well. A sub-
ject from Slavonski Brod who was a member on the city council and involved in 
the preparation for the conflict, relates a similar situation with recruits. The subject 
hailed from a family with strong NDH ties. His father had been in the Wehrmacht, 
most likely the 369th Croatian Reinforced Infantry, as he fought and survived at 
Stalingrad. After also narrowly escaping execution by Yugoslav Partisans in 1947, 
his father continued to be harassed frequently by the Communist authorities and 
eventually emigrated to Germany. In 1971, the subject himself was briefly detained 
for singing patriotic songs in a cafe. According to the subject, when the leaders 
recruited individuals to join the ZNG in Slavonski Brod in 1991, they only dealt 
with those individuals whom they knew and who stood on the “right” side of the 
Croatian question. Moreover, he explicitly stated that by contacting those individu-
als whom they knew and who knew each other it would be difficult for the recruited 
to refuse and say “no” (Slavonski Brod 04/10/2012). 
A subject from Osijek relates that he was also “instructed” to join the Civilian 
Defense (Narodna zaštita, NZ) by his kum. The subject mentions that at the time 
the other joiners all knew each other. They were all “friends with whom they had 
talked with already” (Osijek 04/10/2012), meaning they knew where each stood on 
the Croatian question. Prior to being recruited the subject had contact with the na-
tionalist diaspora through his brother, who lived in Germany and his father had been 
a soldier in the NDH.
Other early participants were contacted directly by HDZ and told to begin 
forming an organization for defense. Two participants in Drniš related that they 
were both contacted by HDZ members in the government and told to prepare for 
war. The last subject from Zagreb did not indicate that he was contacted by anyone 
in particular. Rather he explained he was simply mobilized into the RP sometime 
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during 1990, but that it was boring and not worth talking about. Later he joined the 
1st Brigade. Despite the subject’s lack of a stated interpersonal relationship he still 
fits the profile of the other interviewees. According to the subject it was easier for 
Serbs to live in Yugoslavia than for “regular” Croats. The subject mentioned that 
his family went to church, though quietly, and that he could never marry someone 
who was not a Catholic. The subject had a Serb neighbor, but according to the inter-
view this neighbor did not seem “like a Serb”. Even though this individual did not 
explain his family’s history or who recruited him to join the RP, it is clear that his 
position on the Croatian question was similar to those recruited elsewhere. Given 
the other examples we can speculate that his views were known to those who mo-
bilized him into the RP. 
The final early joiner does not exhibit the same characteristics as those in the 
previous interviews. Though not a party member the subject was somewhat satisfied 
with the stability of the Communist system and feels that all the negative aspects 
of the system intensified after Tito died in 1980. After the Log Revolution, when 
Serbs in Krajina felled trees, blocking roads, and declared the area independent 
from Croatia, the subject became concerned with what was going on and phoned a 
friend who worked in the police. When asked what to do, his friend told him to join 
the civilian defense (Narodna zaštita, NZ), which he did with some other friends. 
Even though the subject seems to have been neutral on the Croatian question, I have 
included him since he joined through a connection in the police department. 
Discussion
What we see from these interviews is that joining early involved several commu-
nity solutions to the collective action problem. Based on the interviews it is appa-
rent that early joiners belonged to a pre-existing community. The boundaries of this 
community were delineated by an individual’s position on the Croatian question. 
Those who shared the position that Croatia and Croats were victims in Yugoslavia, 
disadvantaged and suppressed, were considered members of the same community 
and therefore trustworthy. The establishment of such a community helped lay the 
ground for the knowledge and reciprocity that helped facilitate participation. The 
level of one’s integration into this community through interpersonal relationships 
strengthened the likelihood that he would be recruited and become involved. This 
last point is largely due to the importance of interpersonal connections, known as 
veze, in Southeastern Europe. As Allcock (2000) notes, despite the lack of scien-
tific inquiry into the importance of connections in the former Yugoslavia, “anybody 
who has worked in Yugoslavia for any length of time will have encountered them” 
(2000: 363). Connections in the former Yugoslavia were a necessary way of life. 
Who you knew and how you knew them was important in overcoming bureaucratic 
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hurdles, receiving expedited healthcare, and finding employment. While such rela-
tionships, particularly between families are thought to be a legacy of a pre-modern 
phenomenon in the Balkans, Allcock (2000) offers that actually, in the face of Com-
munism’s hold over civil society, the tradition of connections helped individuals 
overcome the limits of the state’s capacity and the restraints on other forms of social 
interaction. The post-Communist problems such as the lack of an established rule of 
law, coupled with economic uncertainty have ensured that the importance of con-
nections endures in Balkan society. 
The best example of the long history and importance of interpersonal relation-
ships in the Balkans is the concept of kumstvo, which when translated into English 
can refer to godparenthood or even a form of familial sponsorship. In the interviews 
several individuals mentioned being instructed by their kum during the recruitment 
process. While conducting this research we were granted several interviews as a re-
sult of the person requesting the interview for us being the research subject’s kum. 
Kumstvo is a complex Southeastern European social custom. A kum is either a god-
father or a bridegroom; however, kum can also be referred to as the whole family of 
the godfather or bridegroom. For example, a man who was the best man at another 
man’s wedding is kum, while his wife is also kuma and any subsequent children 
from the marriage may also be kum (Hammel 1968). At its core kumstvo establishes 
a strong sense of social reciprocity between the acting parties. An example of its 
importance as a form of reciprocity can been seen in how it was once traditionally 
used to end blood feuds or make amends for a grievous wrong. Righting the wrong 
of an accidental death involved the person responsible for the death offering the 
victim’s family kumstvo. Saving another’s life could also be rewarded with kumstvo 
(Hammel 1968). Though kumstvo is no longer used as a form of restitution for mur-
der, it remains an important social institution. Kumstvo usually possesses asymmet-
ric power relationships, meaning one party is often more obligated than the other 
party; however, there are shared obligations on both sides (Hammel 1968). While it 
is not wholly correct to say that someone cannot refuse a kum’s request, to refuse a 
request would create serious and negative social ramifications, especially in a situ-
ation where a kum is someone with more social importance or greater connections 
than the person being requested to do the favor. This is not to say that an individual 
participated in the conflict simply because his kum told him to, rather it was the 
recruit’s position on the Croatian question, the awareness of that position by those 
seeking recruits, coupled with the recruit’s relationships in the community and with 
his kum that operated together to induce participation in the earliest days of the con-
flict. The interviews evince that the values of the community and the recruits’ desire 
to maintain a good standing as members in that community propelled individuals 
into participation. The request of one’s kum created a situation in which a refusal 
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would easily diminish one’s position within his own social environment. The inter-
views and relationships among the early joiners show that norms of reciprocity and 
forward thinking about one’s future social standing were factors in the first fighters’ 
decisions to participate.
So far I have presented evidence that supports the role of interpersonal re-
lationships and community solutions in order to explain early joiners. To further 
strengthen this argument I look at the marginal role played by material incentives 
in mobilizing this group of participants. Table 4 shows that only three of the 12 
subjects were paid for their participation in the early days of the War. These three 
were paid for their service through their place of employment before the conflict. 
This was standard practice in Yugoslavia. Firms would pay those employees who 
were in the military when they went on short exercises. The firms were then reim-
bursed by the Ministry of Defense. This is interesting as it indicates that for those 
employed and enlisted in the ZNG, participation was materially neutral; however, 
some subjects did say that when in the field their pay was raised to what it was 
when they had to travel for work. Many of the other participants were employed at 
the time of their involvement, but participated in the conflict through organizations 
that were seen as voluntary, such as the NZ or the organized defense in Drniš. Since 
the first actions of the Reserve Police were clandestine, none of those participants 
were paid until they joined the ZNG after or right before the conflict escalated into 
a sustained war.
As it relates to the center-periphery dichotomy we see that the early efforts of 
mobilization involved the center in many different ways. While those who joined 
early clearly show a strong orientation around the conflict’s central cleavage, this 
Table 4: Early Joiners’ Pay
Location
Received pay S. Brod
Podstrana
Zagreb
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alone is not enough to explain their involvement. Nowhere in the interviews did 
any of the subjects mention that they spontaneously decided to fight for Croatian 
independence. The fact that this community existed in Yugoslavia since the Second 
World War and did little in the way of challenging the regime, shows that even the 
strongest of communities continue to face difficulties in overcoming the collective 
action problem. We see that the mobilization process was not a peripheral affair; it 
was initiated from the center of power, by the leadership of HDZ, and it utilized in-
dividuals’ orientations to the central grievances as a way of selecting the most reli-
able and likely recruits. It took the mobilization efforts of HDZ to provide collective 
action solutions. That is, a pre-existing organization with its own incentives and hi-
erarchical structure took the first step in organizing the Croatian forces. At the same 
time, to say that it was only the efforts of the HDZ leadership is also incomplete. To 
have an accurate answer to the question of why the earliest joiners participated at 
all, we have to understand that it was both the pre-existing organization, HDZ, and 
the pre-existing dissident community that made collective action possible. 
This is exemplified by a debate within the HDZ and military leadership between 
Croatia’s second Defense Minister, Martin Špegelj and President Tuđman. Mobiliz-
ing through the party and its interpersonal relationships with individuals within the 
dissident community was a conscious decision by President Tuđman. Tuđman felt 
the need to go through the party, rather than the structures of the official organiza-
tions because he was uncertain of who could be trusted and who could not. In an 
interview with Špegelj, the Minister explained that while he wanted to mobilize the 
Croatian Territorial Defense forces (Teritorijalna obrana, TO), Tuđman was unsure 
that officers in the TO would support Croatia’s independence at that time and pre-
ferred instead to recruit and mobilize through the party and the interpersonal rela-
tionships among recruiters and recruits. Špegelj explained the situation as,
This was the problem: I was trying to organize HV, as a state, not a political or-
ganization... This is what I wanted to accomplish with the organization of the 
Territorial Defense, that had been here 20, 30 years. The Territorial Defense was 
militarily trained and called territorial only because of the way a potential war 
would have been fought. Otherwise, it is an army like any other army. I wanted to 
organize it so that in a relatively short period of time it could be mobilized, armed 
and have a good balance of power toward the opponent. But he [Tuđman] did not 
want that. He wanted mercenaries who will be under his political control. And 
there arose a problem. I could not control him and that’s why in the fall of 1991 I 
resigned. (Zagreb 11/19/2012)
The disagreement between Špegelj and Tuđman appears to be one over the 
importance of individuals’ attachment to the central cleavage and how assured the 
regime could be of such individuals’ participation. Špegelj believed he could mo-
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bilize the TO based on his authority as Defense Minister and through his own per-
sonal relationships with the commanders in the JNA in Croatia.2 Špegelj had been 
a general in charge of the 5th Army of the JNA in the 1980s. As Špegelj said in the 
interview he had Serb commanders willing to defect to the Croatian side. We see 
then that with Špegelj’s plan an individual’s position on the Croatian question or a 
close orientation to the central cleavage was not seen as a necessary precondition 
for participation, rather it was his own personal relationship and the subsequent 
relationships shared with the commanding officers in Croatia. While there is no 
way to know if Špegelj’s plan would have worked as well as he believes it would 
have, the contrast between him and Tuđman does reveal that from at least part of 
the Croatian leadership, community solutions involving the central cleavage were 
seen as important to the Republic’s mobilization efforts. Špegelj explains that eve-
rything was organized through HDZ and not as he wanted it, through the Croatian 
state, in order for Tuđman to be assured of individuals’ “loyalty to the party” (Za-
greb 11/19/2012). Tuđman appears to have understood that those individuals who 
were already disposed to the idea of Croatian independence, Croat grievances and 
connected to individuals in HDZ with the same disposition, would be more likely 
to participate if recruited. As most of the interviews with early joiners demonstrate, 
this was the strategy used by the earliest organizers.
While the central cleavage and grievances may not be important to most of a 
conflict’s participants, in the early stages of the war, prior to the availability of vast 
resources to the weaker organization and before the escalation of violence to the 
point that it induces expanded participation, leaders will target their recruitment 
efforts on those who they know share a strong inclination to the conflict’s central 
cleavage or grievance. This orientation is created by the norms of a particular com-
munity. The fact that it is confined to a community of a certain size may explain 
why at the aggregate level, the relevance of grievances often fails to show a signifi-
cant relationship with the onset of conflict. While the boundaries of a community 
are a necessary precondition, it is the members’ involvement with each other in that 
community via mechanisms for reciprocity and a shared understanding of mutual 
commitments that helps facilitate collective action. 
2 Here I do not quote Špegelj because during the interview his wife, Stanka Špegelj interjected 
and related all of this information. Špegelj just confirmed it. Here is the quote: “Martin was the 
commander of the Western District during Yugoslavia – Croatia, Slovenia and part of Bosnia. 
And he had control of all the barracks, warehouses, people, he knew where everybody was. So 
the Serbs were terribly afraid of him... And since he knew it all, he organized it to take their wea-
pons. He went for example to Varaždin, met with a group of people who he organized to take 
control of the barracks. He got the commander of the barracks to go along, although he was a 
Serb” (Zagreb 11/19/2012).
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Conclusion
The relationship between material rewards available to insurgents and the onset 
of conflict has dominated the literature; however, the positive correlation between 
macro economic variables and conflict may mask the processes underlying a con-
flict’s origins. As this paper shows, the earliest entrants in Croatia’s military organi-
zations were mostly members who belonged to a community of dissidents dissatis-
fied with Croatia’s position in Yugoslavia. At the same time we see that individuals’ 
grievances alone were not enough to mobilize them into participating in conflict, 
rather it was the importance of social relationships within this specific community 
that led to these individuals’ involvement in the war. We have seen then that not 
only is the importance of grievances difficult to measure in the aggregate, as they 
belong only to a minority of the overall population, but that also grievances alone 
are incapable of solving the collective action problem. 
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Appendix 
Information Primary Questions Additional Questions
Life long before the 
war
Could you tell us what life 
was like a few years before 
the war? What was your job? 
How were things in general?
How did you feel about the 
Communists? Why? (Family 
background)
Life shortly before 
the war
Had things changed much 
just before the war? When 
did they change?
In what way? What do you 
think brought those changes? 
Or why did they change?
Feelings toward 
Serbs
During Yugoslavia what was 
life like between Croats and 
Serbs? Were there problems? 
If so what kind of problems?
When did problems appear? 
What do you think were the 
causes of these problems?
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When did and how did 
you begin serving for the 
Homeland? Kad ste se i kako 
stavili u službu domovine?
How did you understand what 
was happening in the country at 
the time?
How did you become involved 
in that? What did you think 
about doing such things?
Risk and threat from 
Serbian aggression
How did you understand the 
threat facing Croats? Kako 
ste doživljavali prijetnju 
s kojom su se suočavali 
Hrvati?
What do you think the Serbs 
wanted in the war?
Joining HV or HOS Could you describe how you 
joined ZNG/HV/HOS? 
How did you decide to join? 
Where? How did you feel 
once you joined? (If HOS, 
ask why not HV)
What was happening in the 
country at that time?
Life in HV or HOS When did you begin to 
be paid? What kind of 
equipment did you receive?
Goals What were your goals for 





Which party did you support 
in the 1991 election? Why 
that one?
What do you think were the 
main differences between HDZ, 
HSP, and SDP?
Perceptions In your mind, when did the 
war begin?
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